From First Principles – The Need for a Fighter-Capable Air Force

Bloggers note:With Appendix 1 at the end of this article:
The Future Security Environment 2008-2030                                         8327
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The Need for a Fighter-Capable Air Force

by Richard Shimooka and Don Macnamara

Richard Shimooka, MSc, is a Defence Analyst affiliated with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI).

Brigadier-General (ret’d) Don Macnamara, OMM, CD, a National Security and Strategic Analyst, is a former president and board member of the CDAI, a member of the Advisory Board of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), and Past-Chair of the Board of Governors of the Royal Military College of Canada.

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol14/no4/page40-eng.asp

Introduction

   When assessing Canada’s defence needs, and hence procuring major weapons systems such as tanks, aircraft and ships, public discussion of the background to the process and the essential and often classified research necessary is seldom evident, nor is accurate and relevant media reporting and commentary.

This, coupled with a certain skepticism and cynicism over defence matters in general and frequently condescending attitudes that such equipment is just ‘toys for the boys,’ in addition to the increasingly common perspective of opposition solely for the sake of opposition.

 This makes a serious and knowledgeable discussion difficult in Parliament, the media, or among what we would hope to be an informed and involved public – all essential elements in our democratic system, but also deserving of serious attention.

The Fundamentals

It is important, at the outset in any such discussion, to recognize and understand the fundamentals. The first and most important responsibility of government is to provide for the security of the country, its sovereignty, and the safety of its inhabitants.

That means the Government is responsible for the protection and promotion of Canada’s national interests. The first and foremost of these interests, for any country, is indeed security, and having the capability to defend its sovereignty and interests, including the use or threat of force if that security is threatened.

The second national interest is the economic well-being of the citizens – their prosperity – important because that also provides the means to support resources for security. As a trading nation, prosperity will be dependent upon a third interest – a stable world order that permits an uninhibited global trade environment and maximizes the generation of wealth.

Such stability also contributes to both national and international security. The final national interest is the protection and support of our values –democracy, the rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights. Taken together, our values and our interests reflect our very way of life in Canada, and what and why Canada tries to contribute to the world at large.

Since the end of the Second World War, Canada’s basic defence policy has been to first provide for the defence of our sovereign land, sea, and aerospace approaches – a very demanding expectation, given our being the country with second-largest land mass in the world, with the longest coastline, and a comparatively small, widely scattered population, largely residing within 160 kilometres of the Canada – United States border.

Second priority is the joint defence of North America with the United States. This has been a pillar of Canadian defence policy since the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, essentially accepting that the United States ‘would not stand idly by should Canada be attacked by a foreign power,’ and Canada, in return, agreed not to permit an attack on the United States from across Canadian territory.

Today, the defence of North America in conjunction with the United States continues, and it is confirmed by the North American Aerospace Defence agreement originating in 1958, wherein both Canadian and United States fighters provide a capability to identify, track, intercept, deter, deflect, or even destroy intruders in the approaches to or in the sovereign aerospace of either Canada or the United States.

Finally, Canada has long recognized its responsibility for international security and its obligations to contribute to NATO and UN military interventions and stabilization operations. Simply put, Canada would want to defend its interests as far as possible from its homeland, given the difficulty of defending its own sovereignty and land area.

Library and Archives Canada (LAC) C-016768

Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

When called upon to respond to the perceived threats using force or the threat of force, the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces – the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force – will represent the whole spectrum of military means available to the Government for operations within Canada, or to contribute to alliance or UN operations abroad in support of our own interests.

At the same time, it is absolutely essential to recognize that the members of an all-volunteer Canadian Armed Forces serve under a condition of ‘unlimited liability’ – that is that they may be called upon by their Government to commit their lives in the defence of the nation’s interests.

In a democracy, there is a reciprocal moral duty – a covenant – understanding that the Canadian Armed Forces or any of its components will not be committed or placed ‘in harm’s way’ capriciously or ill-prepared. Accordingly, they should also be appropriately equipped and trained to undertake the nature of mission predicted and supplied with the necessary logistic support consistent with their deployment.

All or many of these obligations appear to be easily forgotten in the haste to deploy or to disengage. Similarly, public, parliamentary, and media discussions and arguments concerning major equipment procurements are often conducted without reference to these fundamental understandings.

The International Security Environment – Challenge and Response

A global strategic assessment of the international security environment, and identification of events or trends that represent risks or threats to Canadian security, are essential foundational steps. Such assessments, now termed ‘The Future Security Environment,” are normally conducted by the Department of National Defence in cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs, academia, NORAD, NATO, the Governments of Canada’s allies, and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs).

Recognizing that the future truly cannot be forecast, that the only future certainty is surprise, and the only constant in this environment is change, a prudent Government attempts to chart a course to provide the required capability and flexibility needed to protect sovereignty, security, prosperity, world order, and our values.

This has been and is accomplished by identifying the capabilities that the Canadian Armed Forces require, by taking into account trends, the full spectrum of risks, evolving military technology, and forecasting uncertainty.

This strategic assessment* has shown that the world is indeed a messy and dangerous place full of unpredictability. *[Editor’s note: The Summary of Deductions of the 2008 The Future Security Environment 2008–2030 assessment as released by the Chief of Force Development, National Defence Headquarters, is attached in its entirety as Appendix 1 to this article.]

 The global security environment today is complex, dangerous, and even frightening if one starts with the changes brought to the international system over the last century, let alone since 1989, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Since then, the locus of attention has shifted from Central Europe and the Cold War, to the Middle East and surrounding areas in the 1990s, Southwest Asia post-‘9-11,’ and now to the Asia Pacific region.

For the Canadian Armed Forces, the ‘Defence of Canada and its Interests’ is a daunting challenge. Our total force, by world standards, is very small. Indeed, Canada is virtually incapable of large-scale independent combat operations.

This is understandable as, beyond the Defence of Canada role, it is unlikely that Canada would act unilaterally beyond its borders, and yet, Canada commonly contributes to coalition operations. However, Canadian deployed operations are limited in size because, whether land, sea, or air forces, the rotation of manpower, equipment, and logistics support dictates a limited commitment.

The vast size of Canada and its coastline, and the long trans-oceanic distances to virtually all coalition operations, mandate the response, speed, and flexibility of airpower to defend Canada’s interests at home and abroad.

The surveillance and defence of our land, sea and air approaches require long-range patrol and intelligence gathering aircraft, long-range strategic airlift and shorter-range tactical airlift, medium-to-heavy lift helicopters for troop transport into otherwise inaccessible sites, anti-submarine fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, and manned fighter aircraft to provide accountable, precise, and, if so authorized and directed, lethal force.

It must not be forgotten that, if Canada did not have a capability to effectively observe and defend its territory, and could not meaningfully contribute to the defence of North American aerospace, the approaches across Canadian territory would be a threat to the United States.

 In their own vital interest, the United States would be compelled to provide the necessary defence operations in and over Canadian territory – a huge, and, to most Canadians, an unacceptable loss of Canadian sovereignty. Therefore, no Canadian Government could abrogate its commitments to the United States or to Canadian citizens to secure Canadian sovereign territory and our maritime and air approaches to the North American continent.

Within the context of the Asia Pacific and the Arctic, there are indeed foreseeable risks. In the past five years, China has undertaken an increasingly aggressive policy towards asserting its territorial claims in the region.

These include disputing the Senkaku Islands with Japan, the South Seas islands with Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia, and the Line of Actual Control with India. The tenor of these incidents has increased dramatically in recent years, including direct confrontations in the air and on the sea between Chinese and other states’ militaries.

 They included a recent standoff between the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force destroyers off the Senkaku Islands after the unilateral imposition of an air defence zone in the area, and the sinking of several Vietnamese fishing boats by Chinese vessels. Any one of these encounters had the potential to escalate into a major military conflict, which illustrates the tenuous security situation in the region.

It is interesting to note that China is pursuing these military confrontations with its largest economic partners. This throws into doubt claims that globalized trade relationships may constrain or avoid future conflicts.

Rather, it suggests that maintenance of a robust military and stable security situation is essential for the continued health of the current economic system and Canada’s prosperity. More broadly, globalization means that we live in a complex ‘system of systems,’ and the state is vulnerable to the effects of changes in component systems in all parts of the world, and such changes within a single system can and will have an impact upon other systems, the consequences of which can truly threaten our security and other interests.

17 Wing Publishing, Winnipeg

The vastness of Canada’s Arctic is graphically driven home through this overlay of Europe upon the region.

While the threat of direct attack may appear to be minimal, Canada faces greater challenges for maintaining its sovereignty, particularly in the Arctic. Russia has renewed its interest in the region for geostrategic reasons.

This is partly due to deteriorating relations between it and the United States. Polar routes are the most direct avenue of approach between Russia and the United States, a critical strategic consideration. Moreover, the Russian Navy uses the Arctic as a bastion for its ballistic missile submarine fleet, which is a critical consideration with respect to its nuclear capability. In addition to military concerns, Russia has a growing interest in northern economic opportunities.

With the growing exhaustion of its oil and gas reservoirs in southern latitudes, domestic firms must increasingly rely upon new reserves in Siberia and the Arctic to meet the growing demand. The massive liquefied natural gas developments on the Yamal and Sakhalin Peninsulas are two examples of this growing trend.¹

 These aims, among others, have led the Russian government to be more active in maintaining its territorial integrity in the Arctic. Russian bomber and reconnaissance missions in and around the North American air defence identification zones continually challenge our sovereignty, and they force a NORAD reaction to counter the threat. Given the vast distances and sparse population in the north, and the need to react quickly with a response that ranges from identification and monitoring, to lethal force, Canada’s tactical fighters are the country’s only credible response to these and other intrusions to our sovereignty.

UAVs versus Manned Tactical Fighter Aircraft

Given these considerations, it is clear that tactical fighter aircraft are critical for maintaining Canada’s security at home, and asserting its interests abroad. They possess several key features that make them particularly valuable, including responsiveness, flexibility, accountability, and cost efficacy.

Moreover, there is no suitable replacement for a manned fighter aircraft in the near term. While Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been used effectively in niche roles, there are serious technical and legal challenges that will likely prevent a transition to an unmanned fighter force for some time, probably for decades.

 In this context, the US Navy has downgraded its requirements for its Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program to focus upon Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and light strike functions, over a more expansive set of capabilities. In addition, the challenges of developing an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) with the full range of fighter capabilities and attributes were confirmed in 2012 by, then-United States Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz, who envisioned that manned fighters will be required for at least another 30 years.²

Even if UCAVs mature enough to meet these requirements, operations in northern latitudes present further difficulties. Harsh weather, limits on satellite communications and vast uninhabited stretches of territory will prevent unmanned systems from being a reliable and effective replacement for a manned fighter capability until UAV technologies are developed to mitigate these challenges.

In addition to domestic security concerns, tactical fighters are an essential instrument for Canada’s foreign and security policy. As noted earlier, China’s economic rise and assertive military posture have resulted in a growing sense of insecurity by China’s neighbours and the United States. Any conflict in the Asia-Pacific would likely involve six of Canada’s top ten trading partners, accounting for over 90 percent of our foreign trade.

 Furthermore, any conflict that may occur will likely be fought with ‘cutting edge’ military capabilities, and possibly, over large ocean expanses for deployment and engagement. When such a situation demands immediate action, precision, and accountability, tactical fighters are the only credible response Canada can make to any crisis in the region.

The focus on a new massive confrontation in the Asia Pacific ignores the wide variety of possible scenarios in which states may engage using military force. In the past five years, potential areas of involvement have included North Korea, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Libya, Iran, and Syria.

While Canada and the international community have not been involved in all these conflict zones, manned tactical fighters provide the government of the day with an extremely flexible response to any crisis in which it deems action to be in Canada’s interest.

They can be deployed to a crisis anywhere in the world (provided the necessary facilities exist) in less than 72 hours after the issuance of a warning order, and they can undertake a wide variety of missions. For example, RCAF CF-18s have been called upon to enforce no-fly zones in Bosnia, to provide ground support for NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia, to perform interdiction missions in Kosovo, to contribute to the NATO operation in Libya, and, as a component of NATO’s ‘show of force’ to conduct a deployment in response to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Removing Canada’s tactical fighter capability would rob Canada of the flexibility and responsiveness to meaningfully contribute to world security, and, in due course, would impact Canada’s economic development.

Cost Effectiveness

Moreover, airpower as an instrument of military power vis-à-vis other forms of force has increased in the past decade. It is agile, integrated, precise, accountable, and responsive, and it has global reach.

The disappointing outcome of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with their high costs, has decreased decision makers’ appetites for large ground deployments.

 Large standing armies are costly to support, not only in peacetime and during operations, but also for decades afterwards in the form of entitlement programs for veterans. These costs have generally exceeded inflation, particularly when death and long-term disability payments from operations are factored in.³

Air capabilities certainly have high capital costs. Tactical fighters are expensive to develop, acquire, and sustain. Canada’s current generation of fighters, the CF-18 Hornet, is rapidly reaching the end of its usable service life, and it must be replaced by a newer aircraft. This fleet will also require periodic avionics and systems upgrades to maintain combat capabilities, which can be a costly proposition.⁴

 Once these costs are paid, however, tactical fighters can be a much cheaper alternative to other forms of national power, particularly due to significantly lower personnel costs. For example, a Canadian Armed Forces battle group deployment into a conflict involves upwards of 2000 soldiers often supported by a large-scale air mobility operation.

The deployment of six fighters, tankers, transport, and Long Range Patrol aircraft to Italy for Operation Unified Protector over Libya required only 200 personnel in support.

In the final analysis, an air force with balanced capabilities that can provide a rapidly deployable lethal force of fighter aircraft is an essential component of both continental and international defence of Canada’s national security interests.

Conclusion

When addressing Canada’s defence needs from first principles – from a Government’s first responsibility to secure the country, the role of and duty to the nation’s armed forces, the strategic assessment of threats to Canada’s security, sovereignty, and other national interests, to the determination of the means and capabilities to provide for that first responsibility – it is clear that Canada is challenged by the emerging security environment.

Discussions of specific equipment needs, whether aircraft, ships, or army combat capabilities and assets, must be holistic, and they must incorporate the various principles and issues identified in this article. When it comes to fighter aircraft, the speed, flexibility, accountability, and lethality of a fighter-capable air force is very much in Canada’s national security interest.

Furthermore, the need for an engaged and informed public, insightful media, and knowledgeable and detailed Parliamentary debate is indeed in the best interests of the protection of Canada’s national interests.

Four possible contenders for the CF-18 Hornet replacement appear below:

B14187 © Boeing

The Boeing F/A-18E/F Advanced Super Hornet

Lockheed Martin/www.flickr.com/ID8139328835

The Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II

© Dassault Aviation – V. Almansa

The Dassault Rafale

© Eurofighter-Geoffrey Lee, Planefocus Limited

The Eurofighter Typhoon

Appendix 1:

The Future Security Environment 2008-2030

Chief of Force Development
National Defence Headquarters
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2

Available at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/ collection_2011/dn-nd/D4-8-1-2010-eng.pdf.

Summary of Deductions

Economic and Social Trends

1. While globalization will bring greater economic prosperity to more nations, the gap between rich and poor nations and individuals could possibly widen. Economic disparity will be a source of tension and potential conflict.
2. Developed nations will find it in their best interest to pursue diplomatic solutions for the protection of economic investments, trade, and transportation routes; however, aggressive responses to threats to trade or economic well- being are always a possibility.
3. Protection of both continental and international trade routes from disruption will be essential to Canada’s economic well-being. Because of the trans- national nature of maritime trade, the CF could possibly be asked to provide increased surveillance and other resources to keep potential threats away from vulnerable ports and transportation routes and to respond to threats that find their way into Canada’s transportation infrastructure system.
4. The mass movement of large segments of people is destabilizing and may result in civil unrest, regional clashes, or humanitarian crises that require response and resolution through the diplomatic, development, and/or defence instruments of developed nations.
5. The urbanization of the world’s populations will continue. The failure of the megalopolis in the developing world will increase the risk of disease, pandemic, and humanitarian crisis and will also accentuate the increasingly urbanized nature of conflict and the need for urban warfare capabilities.
6. Nations will have to be prepared to respond to the consequences of the global outbreak of infectious diseases.
7. Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia are regions where instability and inequality stemming from extreme poverty could possibly require humanitarian and/or stabilization missions
8. Religious extremism will continue to be motivated by narratives founded on disagreement with secular and pluralistic social and governance models. The simplicity of these narratives will continue to attract followers across the globe, threatening Canada and its interests at home and abroad.
9. Youth bulges and high unemployment will continue to characterize the demographic profile of the developing world and will act as a root cause of regional and international instability.
10. Aging Western populations will be challenged to find recruits to sustain defence and armed force structures as competition for labour will occur worldwide in the private, public, and defence sectors, especially in Canada.

Environmental and Resource Trends

11. Climate change will result in increasingly violent weather patterns, drought, and natural disasters that will demand military support to assist victims around the world, ranging from humanitarian relief to full scale stability operations.
12. As the impact of global climate change becomes more widespread, the CF will need to consider the effectiveness of military systems, capabilities, and platforms associated with operating in extreme environmental conditions. Increased access to the Arctic, brought about by climate change, will have sovereignty, security, and environmental implications for Canada that will result in increased CF engagement in the Arctic region.
13. Worldwide harvesting and exploitation of the ocean’s resources will not only continue in the future but will also intensify to the point where access, stewardship, and ownership may be possible sources of confrontation. There will be greater demand for the maritime surveillance capabilities of the CF and for standing patrols of marine space under Canadian jurisdiction.
14. Sufficient potable water and food – basic life requirements – will remain inaccessible to millions of people, particularly in the developing world. Developed nations will probably be called upon to provide humanitarian, stabilization, and/or reconstruction assistance.
15. Concerns over rising prices for, and access to, oil will probably be addressed through diplomatic means, but tensions and – even conflict – could possibly arise between states that are pursuing control over dwindling supplies. As demand for oil begins to outstrip supply, viable energy alternatives will have to be found to run economies and militaries.
16. Competition for strategic minerals and metals will slowly increase as technological developments result in increased demand for them. Dollar diplomacy and diplomatic pressure could possibly succeed in securing adequate supply and access for the most powerful states.

Geopolitical Trends

17. Multilateral cooperation will remain essential, although coalitions of the willing will arise to challenge the perceived inertia of traditional organizations.
18. The effectiveness of the UN in dealing with violent crises will continue to be limited, but the organization will continue to play an important relevant role in humanitarian crises.
19. NATO will continue to play an important role in Western security affairs in the foreseeable future. However, it is probable that coalitions of the willing will displace the Alliance on many missions considered politically sensitive or urgent.
20. The EU will play a growing role in European security affairs but, barring the emergence of a direct and clear threat to European security, will probably continue to focus more on issues of internal governance than on international security.
21. Canada will continue to be interested in, and supportive of, the initiatives of the Organization of American States since it will ensure greater political and social stability in the region and will continue to be a mechanism for assisting in the prevention of terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere.
22. The Association of South-East Asian Nations will continue to play a regional security role by providing a forum for dialogue and cooperation; this will probably indirectly enhance the security of the member countries by building economic and cultural relationships.
23. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation will continue to play a valuable role in fostering and maintaining non-security related relationships, but its effects on the security environment will be of second order, rather than direct.
24. The African Union is a potential entity for contributing to peace, prosperity, and stability on the African continent. Increasing AU capabilities could possibly reduce demand for military engagement in Africa, as unrest and instability could possibly be addressed through the AU and through diplomatic and development aid.
25. The continued existence and expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will have to be monitored closely as the SCO could possibly increase tensions between eastern and western powers.
26. The United States will retain conventional military supremacy, but increasing economic challenges could erode its dominant position. Because of its unmatched military capabilities, adversaries will focus on asymmetric ways and means of undermining the superpower status of the United States.
27. The economic, military, and diplomatic rise of China will alter the global balance of power in the coming decades. China will be a regional, and possibly global, challenger to the economic power of the United States and, at the very least, a regional challenger to US military power in the Asia-Pacific region. It is unlikely that the US will quietly accept the erosion of its influence, which could possibly lead to increased tensions.
28. India’s plans for military modernization are ambitious but will take many years to come to fruition.
29. Wanting to be a player on the world stage again, Russia will pursue warmer relations with Europe, NATO, and the United States in order to prevent marginalization and help recreate Russia as at least a regional power. For the foreseeable future, Russia will not aggressively challenge the United States or its allies.
30. The existing security environment in Latin America appears benign at first glance, but the activities of violent non-state actors will increase, possibly causing, as a second- or third-order effect, limited state-on-state conflict.
31. Maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific will continue to face massive developmental challenges over the coming decades, with a number of key areas threatened by Muslim extremism. Australia and New Zealand will continue to be challenged by the need to balance great and regional power relationships, instability within what they consider their inner strategic arc, the enormity of the geographic reality of the region, and the variance in socio-cultural and ethnic context of state fragility that does not allow for blanket regional stability and development strategies.
32. The Middle East will remain volatile for the foreseeable future, and current conflicts show little promise of quick resolution. Western nations will probably provide diplomatic aid as opposed to engagement in prolonged regional and internal confrontations. Nevertheless, an expansion of American participation in conflicts in the Middle East cannot be dismissed it if is deemed to be in the interests of the United States.
33. A growing trend towards radicalized Islam and increasingly weak governance structures will continue to threaten the stability of the Central and South Asian region, prolonging the need for an international presence in Afghanistan and further eroding central authority in Pakistan.
34. Based on indicators of instability, Sub-Saharan Africa will probably see a significant number of states fail. The requests for developed nations – including Canada – to intervene with humanitarian, stabilization, and/or reconstruction missions will probably increase.

Science and Technology Trends

35. Nanotechnology will be instrumental in revolutionizing science and technology developments such as miniaturization, thereby altering defence applications for materials, processors, sensors, and human performance.
36. Developments in information, communications, computing, and sensor technologies are resulting in network-centric concepts and solutions that challenge existing hierarchies. Trends in technology will reach a point where computing, knowledge access, sensing, and the increased use of autonomous intelligent systems are omnipresent.
37. Convergence of bio and nanotechnology will develop new drug therapies, customized treatments, organic prosthetics, and enhance human performance. It is probable that adversaries will exploit these advances in to create more potent biological weapons, which will be countered by simultaneous advances in detection capabilities.
38. Although slow to emerge, the development of new energy technologies will be market driven and should somewhat reduce the demand for oil and fossil fuel worldwide. Research and development into more efficient electrical energy generation will allow military forces to function autonomously in remote regions for extended periods of time.
39. Advances in cognitive and behavioural science may make it possible to overcome traditional human barriers resulting from sustained operations, environmental ambiguity, and information overload.

Military and Security Trends

40. Future operations will find the CF working among, with, and against a diverse array of other armed groups, such as private military contractors, militias, armed followings, bandits, criminal syndicates, gangs, and insurgents. Additionally, the CF and its allies will also need to work with NGOs, who will be increasingly present in future theatres of operation, whenever possible to help achieve desired ends.
41. Adversarial non-state actors will seek to overcome an advanced military’s strengths through employing such means as irregular warfare, the acquisition and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the disruption of electronic information infrastructures through cyber attacks. Asymmetric tactics will also be viable options for state adversaries.
42. Countering terrorism is primarily a political and legal challenge, but the trans- national nature of this threat means that militaries will probably be called upon in certain circumstances to assist civil authorities and will certainly be faced with the effects of terrorism in operational theatres.
43. The increasing commercialization of weapons will allow some developing nations and non-state actors to acquire inexpensive and sophisticated military capabilities. Hence, Canada and its allies will be confronted by a mixture of conventional, CBRN, and novel technology weapons in the hands of a variety of state and non-state actors, thus necessitating that Canada be able to apply the full spectrum of capabilities, even against non-state actors.
44. Modern nations will have a stake in protecting space-based assets and will need to maintain robust and redundant capabilities that anticipate the loss of at least some current competitive information technology advantages. Interstate rivalries and conflict in the future will probably extend into space, and even non-state actors and some less developed nations will probably be able to access and use assets in this environment, thus eroding the exclusive advantage currently possessed by modern militaries.

Conclusions

45. A complex future security environment will demand a comprehensive, integrated, adaptive, and networked focus in the application of government policy.

DND photo IS2014-1031-01 by Sergeant Matthew McGregor

A CF-18 Hornet comes alongside an RCAF CC-130T Hercules to refuel just off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise RIMPAC, 14 July 2014.

Notes

1. The Russian Gas Matrix-How Markets are Driving Change, at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/05/27-russian-gas-matrix.
2. Available at: http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20120724/NEWS/ 207240327/Schwartz-AF-needs-manned-aircraft-despite-UAVs.
3. See Congressional Budget office Cost of Military pay benefits on the Defence Budget, at: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/ 11-14-12-MilitaryComp_0.pdf. A Canadian discussion can be seen in Parliamentary Budget Officer :The Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, 9 October 2008, at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/PBO-DPB/documents/2008-10-09%20Statement%20-%20Afghanistan.pdf.
4. Malcolm Chalmers, “Defence Inflation: Reality or Myth”?, at Royal United Services Institute, June 2009, p.14. Available at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Comment_Defence_Inflation_Myth_or_Reality.pdf. sed by modern militaries.